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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

TROY LABRUM,
Defendant/Appellant.

: Case No. 930235-CA
Priority No. 2
:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993).

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
Emphasis added.

The

fourteenth

amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution, section 1 provides:
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Emphasis added.

Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 7.

[Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property , without due process of law.

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec• 12•

[Rights of accused persons•]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to
testify against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense.

2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990) provides:
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission
of offense or for conduct of another.
Every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense who directly
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be
criminally liable as a party for such conduct.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203

(1990) provides in pertinent

part:
76-3-203.
Felony conviction -- Indeterminate term of
imprisonment -- Increase of sentence if firearm
used.
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as
follows:
(2)
In the case of a felony of the second
degree, for a term at not less than one year nor
more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a
firearm was used in the commission or furtherance
of the felony, the court shall additionally
sentence the person convicted for a term of one
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
the court may additionally sentence the person
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed
five
years
to
run
consecutively
and
not
concurrently;
Emphasis added.

3

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1

(Supp. 1993) provides in

pertinent part:
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons
-- Enhanced penalties.
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in
Subsection (3) in concert with two or more persons
is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense
as provided below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as
used in this section means the defendant and two or
more other persons would be criminally liable for
the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202.
(3) The enhanced penalties
under this section are:

for offenses

committed

(d) If the offense is a second degree felony,
the convicted person shall be sentenced to an
enhanced minimum term of six years in prison.
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate
offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the
primary offense.
(b)
It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced
penalties under this section that the persons with
whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or
convicted, or that any of those persons are charged
with or convicted of a different or lesser offense.
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty
under this section. The imposition of the penalty
is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing
judge that this section is applicable.
In
conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter
written
findings
of
fact
concerning
the
applicability of this section.
Emphasis added.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the incomplete record requires that Mr.

Labrum be granted a new trial?
Standard of review -- correctness. This is a question of
law reviewable for correctness.

Where portions of the record are

missing and cannot be reconstructed by agreement of the parties, a
new trial is required.

State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah

1983) .

2.

Whether the prosecutor's direct comments on witness

credibility constitute misconduct requiring reversal?
Standard of Review -- plain error.
When objections are not made at trial and properly
preserved, appellate review is under a "plain error"
standard. Plain errors are those that "should have been
obvious to the trial court and that affect the
substantial rights of the accused."
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P. 2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992)

(quoting

State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210-11 (Utah App. 1991).

3.
firearm

was

Whether the jury's failure to make a finding that a
used

in

this

offense

requires

that

the

firearm

enhancement be set aside?
Standard of review

-- correctness.

This involves, a

question of statutory construction. The trial court's construction
of a statute is a question of law reviewed for correctness.
Estate of Anderson, 821 P.2d 1169, 1171
Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah App. 1991).
5

In re

(Utah 1991); State v.

4.

Whether the "gang enhancement"1 is constitutional,2

and was properly applied in this case?
Standard of review

—

correctness.

This involves a

question of statutory construction. The trial court's construction
of a statute is a question of law reviewed for correctness.
Estate of Anderson, 821 P.2d

1169, 1171

In re

(Utah 1991); State v.

Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah App. 1991).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Troy Labrum (d.o.b. 7/6/74) and co-defendant David Mills
(8/30/72) were charged in an amended information

(R. 7-9) with

attempted homicide, a 2nd degree felony, stemming from a drive-by
shooting at 2100 South and 700 East on September 20, 1992.
information

also

indicated

that the State would be

The

seeking

a

firearm enhancement (Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1990)) and "gang"
enhancement
third

(Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.1

defendant,

Joshua

Behunin

(d.o.b.

(Supp. 1993)).
3/25/75) was

Id.

A

handled

through the juvenile system.

HJtah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1993), commonly referred
to as the gang enhancement.
2

Mr. Labrum did not challenge the constitutionality of the
gang enhancement below. However, the trial court's failure to make
written findings as required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5) (c)
necessitates that the increased sentence pursuant to the gang
enhancement be vacated. Anticipating that this Court will remand
to allow the trial court to make the necessary findings, appellant
represents that a constitutional challenge will be made at that
time. In the interests of judicial economy, this court should give
the trial court guidance as to the constitutionality and proper
application of the gang enhancement, as it will be appealed if
reimposed.
6

Jury trial was held February 16-18 before Senior Judge
Jay E. Banks. See transcripts, R. 97-279 (Feb. 16), 280-485 (Feb.
17), and 486-627 (Feb. 18). Mr. Labrum and his co-defendant were
convicted.

R. 49 (verdict for Mr. Labrum), 615-6.

Mr. Labrum was sentenced on March 22, 1993 to a term of
1

to

15 years, to run consecutively with

enhancement
restitution.3

and

5

year

firearm

the

enhancement,

6 year gang
and

to

pay

R. 8 0 (attached as Addendum A ) .

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The transcript of the trial is not complete.

The court

reporter did not record the instructions given to the jury. See R.
504-6.

The reporter begins by noting:

(Whereupon, the Judge commenced the reading of the
Instructions at 10:05 a.m. -- not reported on the
record.)
The

reporter notes a sidebar concerning

transcribes half a page.

instruction

20, and

The transcript continues:

(The Court continues to read the Instructions
starting with No. 21. The time now is 10:45 a.m.)

3

The trial court's application of the enhancements appears
incorrect. The firearm enhancement provides for a consecutive 1
year sentence, and an optional consecutive sentence of 0 to 5.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (1990).
The Judgment, Sentence
(Commitment) appears to show a determinate 5 year sentence for the
firearm enhancement. The gang enhancement provides for an enhanced
minimum term of 6 years. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(3) (d) . Mr.
Labrum7s sentence (if both enhancements were appropriate) should
therefore have been 6 to 15 years (2nd degree felony plus gang
enhancement), consecutive with a 1 year term (firearm enhancement),
consecutive with a 0 to 5 years term (discretionary firearm
enhancement). Appellant contends here that neither enhancement was
properly imposed and both must be vacated.
7

(Throughout the reading of the Instructions,
the Judge injected comments which were not part of the
written Instructions. These comments were inserted in an
ad lib manner, and I was not aware that his words were
anything other than what was on the printed page until
after hearing complete sentences.
Therefore, these
comments were not reported.)
(Time is 10:55 a.m. )
R. 505-6.

For a period of 50 minutes, therefore, the reporter

transcribed only half a page.
In closing arguments, the prosecutor twice vouched for
the truthfulness of state witnesses. Mr. Jones made the following
statements:
But I thought Mr. Owens was at least candid and honest
and he said, I didn't recognize him because he changed
his appearance and it threw me off.
R. 512.
It's just an incredible coincidence that a
police officer sees these three people together?
I thought he was very candid and honest. He
didn't try to overstep it.
R. 521.
When the jury returned its verdicts, it made no finding
whatsoever that a firearm was used in the commission of the
offense.

See R. 49, 615-7

(jurors return their verdict, are

polled, and excused without making any finding that a firearm was
used).
The court record contains no written findings concerning
the applicability of the gang enhancement as required by Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5)(c) (Supp. 1993).

8

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The transcript of the trial contains a prejudicial
omission for a period of fifty minutes while the trial court read
the jury instructions.

The transcript indicates the trial court

"ad libbed" throughout the reading of the instructions. The trial
court made prejudicial statements during prior "ad libbing' in the
voir dire phase of the trial.

Absent a complete record, Mr.

Labrum's appeal right is violated. Mr. Labrum should be granted a
new trial.
In closing arguments, the prosecutor vouched for the
truthfulness of two of his witnesses. These prejudicial statements
were

plain

error.

The

evidence

in

this

case

was

highly

conflicting, and it is likely that the jury was swayed by the
prosecutor's improper remarks.
The jury made no finding that a firearm was used in the
commission of the offense charged.

§ 76-3-203 requires that the

trier of fact make a finding that a firearm was used before the
enhanced sentence may be imposed.

Absent such a finding, the

firearm enhancement must be vacated.
The

trial

court

failed

to

enter

written

findings

concerning the applicability of the gang enhancement as required by
§ 76-3-203.1(5) (c) . The enhanced sentence must be vacated.

The

gang enhancement statute is unconstitutionally vague, both as to
its terms and as to standards for enforcement,. As a matter of due
process, the statute should require a jury determination by proof
beyond

a reasonable

doubt.

The evidence
9

in this case was

insufficient to support application of the gang enhancement.

The

enhanced sentence should be vacated.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE INCOMPLETE RECORD IN THIS CASE
PRECLUDES COMPLETE REVIEW ON APPEAL, AND
REQUIRES THAT MR. LABRUM BE GRANTED A NEW
TRIAL.
The transcript in this case conclusively reveals that the
record is incomplete.

The court reporter failed to record the

reading of the instructions.

Throughout the instructions, the

trial court "injected comments which were not part of the written
Instructions

...

in an ad lib manner."

R. 505.

There is no

legal reason, or excuse for this failure to transcribe this portion
of the trial proceedings.
In State v. Taylor, 664 p.2d 439 (Utah 1983) the Supreme
Court reversed a jury conviction due to inadequacies

in the

transcript of jury voir dire:
When faced with claims that a juror's responses to voir
dire questions demonstrated actual bias, this Court is
not at liberty on appeal to assume what those answers
showed when they are totally absent from the record and
cannot be reconstructed by agreement of the parties.
Therefore, it was error for the district court to fail to
order a new trial in the face of this inadequate record.
Id. at 447 (footnote omitted).
In this case, the transcript itself indicates that the
trial

court

instructions.

"ad

libbed"

throughout

the reading of

the

jury

Similar "ad libbing" can be seen in the voir dire

phase of the trial, and prejudicial statements were made by the
trial court:
10

The legislature fixes the sentence. And it's
the duty of the Court to impose sentencing. And before
I would impose sentencing, I would want to know something
about the background of each of these defendants,
together with other information.
But the penalty fixed by the legislature is
what we call an Indeterminate Sentence. That means they
impose a minimum and maximum sentence. And in this case
they have imposed a penalty of 1 to 15 years in the Utah
State Penitentiary and/or a fine not exceeding $10,000.
Now, as I indicated to you, it's the duty for
the Court to impose sentence. I may place a person on
probation on condition --on any condition that I feel is
justified. And I have the discretion of doing that -imposing some jail time, imposing any condition such as
maybe education, participation in programs, anything like
that that I see fit to do.
But if I commit either one or both of them to
the state penitentiary, then my jurisdiction ceases and
the jurisdiction passes to the Board of Pardons.
R. 112 (emphasis added).
The import of these statements is that the trial court
fully expects a conviction.

Sentence will be imposed.

court is not speaking in the abstract;

The trial

rather, it is referring

specifically to the two defendants before it in this case, and the
fact that it will be imposing sentence.

These statements fly in

the face of the defendants' due process right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

See State

v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Utah App. 1988); Sandstrom v. Montana,
442 U.S. 510, 520, 99 S. Ct. 2450,

, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 48 (1979); In

re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072-3, 25 L.Ed.2d
368, 375 (1970).
With the record as it stands, it is impossible to tell
what additional prejudicial statements the trial court might have
made while "ad libbing" to the jury during the reading of the jury
instructions.

Unlike State v. Menzies, 845 P. 2d 220, 240 (Utah
11

1992) , the omission here does not involve only argument outside the
presence

of

the

jury.

This

omission

may

not

be

cured

by

"review[ing] any claim that could have conceivably raised at this
point as though it had been properly preserved."

Id.

(footnote

omitted).
The lack of a proper transcript precludes and impinges on
Mr. Labrum's constitutional right to a full appeal as guaranteed by
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, and requires that
this case be reversed for a new trial at which a complete record
can be made,

POINT II. THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY VOUCHED
FOR THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THE STATE'S
WITNESSES.
On

two

occasions,

the

prosecutor

vouched

for

truthfulness of testimony given by the State's witnesses.
thought Mr. Owens was at least~candid and honest . . . ."
"I thought he was very candid and honest."

the

"But I
R. 512.

R. 521.

Rule 608(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, bars admission of an
expert's

testimony

as

particular occasion.
Opinion
testimony

testimony

to the

truthfulness

of

a witness

on a

State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) .

concerning

addressing

a

credibility

witness'

must

general

be

limited

reputation

to
for

truthfulness, leaving the credibility determination for the factfinder.

State

v.

Hovt,

806

P.2d

204

(Utah App.

1991).

A

prosecutor may not ask a defendant to comment on the veracity of
other witnesses.

State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 1992);
12

State v. Palmer, No. 930192-CA, slip op. at 5-6 (Utah App. July 22,
1993) .
The prosecutor is in no better position than an expert,
the defendant, or any other witness to address the credibility of
the

State's

witnesses

at

trial.

The prosecutor's

statements

constitute misconduct, and Mr. Labrum should be granted a new
trial.
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two prong test
for reversals for improper statements of counsel. State v. Valdez,
513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973) ; see also State v. Trov. 688 P.2d 483, 486
(Utah 1984); State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48 (Utah 1983), overruled
on other grounds in State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d 235, 239
1985); State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d

750

(Utah

(Utah 1982); State v.

Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1976).
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case
is, did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors
matters which they would not be justified in considering
in determining their verdict, and were they, under the
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced
by those remarks.
Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426.

See also State v. Palmer, No. 930192-CA,

slip op. at 3 (Utah App. July 22, 1993).
The prosecutor here drew the jurors attention to matters
which they would not be justified in considering in determining
their

verdict.

veracity

of

The

prosecutor's

the State's witnesses

personal

opinion

considerable

latitude

in commenting
13

the

is not probative, does not

constitute evidence in the case, and is improper.
has

about

on

The prosecutor

the evidence,

see

Valdez, 513 P. 2d at 427, but is not at liberty to express his
personal views concerning the veracity of his own witnesses.
The

evidence

in

this

case

was

highly

conflicting.

Defense alibi witnesses were contradicted by the State's paid
informant.

Compare testimony of paid informant Kevin McCray (R.

284-220) with that of Stan Spears (R. 421-433), Connie Labrum (R.
433-442), Lynette Ward (R. 467-483), and Joseph Kelly (R. 443-467)
(alibi

for automobile

allegedly used).

The incident

occurred

rapidly and the victims had only a brief opportunity to view the
perpetrators on any of the approximately three occasions they saw
the other vehicle in traffic.

E.g., R. 183 ("shooting happened

pretty fast"); 198-9 ("couple of seconds"); 241 ("A couple seconds.
Five at the most.").

Two victims identified Mr. Labrum but could

not identify Mr. Mills; the other two victims identified Mr. Mills
but could not identify Mr. Labrum.
closing).
evidence,

See, e.g. , R. 584 (prosecutor's

Given the conflicting and contentious nature of the
it is more

likely that the jury was swayed by the

prosecutor's improper statements:
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their
weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible of
differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood
that they will be improperly influenced through the
remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors
may
be searching
for guidance
in weighing and
interpreting the evidence.
They may be especially
susceptible to influence, and a small degree of influence
may be sufficient to affect the verdict.
Counsel is
obligated in such cases to avoid, as far as possible, any
reference to those matters the jury is not justified in
considering.
Trov, 688 P.2d at 486-87.
Mr. Labrum should be granted a new trial.
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POINT

III.
THE FIREARM ENHANCEMENT WAS
IMPROPERLY APPLIED BECAUSE THE JURY MADE
NO FINDING THAT A FIREARM WAS USED IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.

The prosecution neither sought nor received a special
verdict concerning whether a firearm, facsimile, or representation
of a firearm was used in the commission of the offense. The jury's
verdict does not address the issue. Absent a finding by the trier
of fact, the trial court is not at liberty to impose the firearm
enhancement.
There can be no question that the jury is the trier of
fact in a jury trial. Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P. 2d 598, 601 (Utah
1983) ("exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility
of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make findings of fact") .
See also jury instruction 5 (R. 54) ("The function of the jury is
to try the issues of fact

. . . .");

instruction 9 (R. 58)

("exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of the evidence"); Instruction No. 10 (R. 59) ("final judges
and must determine from the evidence what the facts are").
The firearm enhancement statute requires that "if the
trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the representation
of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the
felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted
for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently;
and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively
and not concurrently . . . ."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1990).

Statutes are interpreted according to the plain meaning of their
15

words.

State v. Cox, 826 P. 2d 656, 662

(Utah App. 1992) . The

requirements of the plain language of the statute have not been
satisfied.

The trial court should not have imposed the firearm

enhancement, and that sentencing enhancement should be vacated.

POINT
IV.
THE
GANG
ENHANCEMENT
IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL,
AND
EVEN
IF
CONSTITUTIONAL WAS MISAPPLIED IN THIS
CASE.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ENTER
WRITTEN FINDINGS AS REQUIRED BY THE
STATUTE.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (5) (c) provides:
The imposition of the penalty is contingent upon a
finding by the sentencing judge that this section is
applicable.
In conjunction with sentencing the court
shall enter written findings of fact concerning the
applicability of this section.
The record does not contain separate written findings as required.
Absent

such

findings,

the

enhancement

must

be

vacated.

Mr.

Labrum's sentence should be corrected accordingly.

B.

THE GANG ENHANCEMENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
1.

Defendants are Entitled to a
Jury Finding of Liability Under
the Statute by Proof Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt Before the
Sentence
Enhancement
Is
Imposed.

(This issue is currently pending before the Utah Supreme
Court in State v. Fred A. Alvarez, No. 910019, and is due to be
argued the first week of September.)
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Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees
defendants the right to a jury trial.

A jury, rather than the

trial court, should make the factual findings concerning the
applicability of the sentencing enhancement.
The gang enhancement statute states that M[t]his section
does not create any separate offense but provides an enhanced
penalty for the primary offense."
form

over

substance.

Oregon

The legislature is elevating

has

stated

that

"facts

which

constitute the crime are for the jury and those which characterize
the defendant are for the sentencing judge."

State v. Wedge, 652

P. 2d 773, 777 (Or. 1982) . This distinction should be recognized in
Utah.
Wedcre involved a sentencing enhancement for use of a
firearm in the commission of an offense. The Oregon Supreme Court
found:
Although the challenged statute is denominated
an enhanced penalty statute, in effect it creates a new
crime. The jury only considered evidence offered on the
question of first degree robbery, and convicted him of
that offense, but the defendant was sentenced on the
basis of having been found guilty of the crime of "first
degree robbery using a firearm." If the legislature had
actually described the crime as "first degree robbery
using a firearm" the use of the firearm would certainly
be an element and there would be no doubt defendant would
have a right to a jury determination of guilt. The
legislature cannot eliminate constitutional protections
by separating and relabeling elements of a crime.
Id. at 778.
The gang enhancement does not state what standard of
proof is to be applied by the trial court in making its findings of
fact.

The statute provides that

l!,
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[i]n concert with two or more

persons7 as used in this section means the defendant and two or
more other persons would be criminally liable for the offense as
parties

under

Section

76-2-202."

Other

parties

can

only

be

criminally liable if convicted by proof beyond a reasonable doubt
by a unanimous jury.

By incorporating Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202,

implicitly the conduct and intent of the other actors must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Even

if

not

required

as

a

matter

of

statutory

construction, due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Under the state due process clause the facts supporting application
of the enhancement should be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf.
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 577-80, 585-88, 591 (Utah 1987)
(Justices Stewart, Durham, and Zimmerman, in separate opinions,
collectively hold that aggravating circumstances in felony cases
are elements of the crime which the jury must unanimously find
beyond a reasonable doubt). Absent some express standard, there is
a serious danger that trial courts will make findings based on a
lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although the federal due process clause does not provide
the protections Mr. Labrum seeks here,4 under the state due process
clause

this Court

should

find that commission of a crime

"in

concert with two or more persons" is a new offense and factual
determinations

should

reasonable doubt.

be made by

the

jury by proof

beyond

a

Utah law provides for a jury determination for

4

McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91
L.Ed.2d 67 (1986).
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both the firearm enhancement (Utah Code Ann, § 76-3-2*03) and under
the habitual criminal statutes (Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 et seq.
(1990) ) .

The

enhancement.

same

Mr.

protections

Labrum's

should

sentencing

apply

to

enhancement

the
should

gang
be

vacated, and the case remanded for a jury determination of the
applicability of the enhancement.

2.

The Gang Enhancement
for Vagueness.

is Void

The due process clauses of both the federal and state
constitutions prohibit application of criminal statutes that are
vague.

In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-9, 92

S.Ct. 2294,

, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-8

(1972) the Supreme Court

described this doctrine:
It is a basic principle of due process that an
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are
not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important
values.
First, because we assume that man is free to
steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that
laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so
that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the
innocent by not providing fair warning.
Second, if
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those
who apply them.
A vague law impermissibly delegates
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application. Third, but related, where a vague statute
"abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment
freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of
[those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead
citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone7 . .
. than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were
clearly marked."
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In Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-8, 103. S.Ct.
1855,

, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983), the Court clarified:

Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to
citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized
recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness
doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other principal
element of the doctrine -- the requirement that a
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement." Where the legislature fails to provide
such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit "a
standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors,
and juries to pursue their personal predilections."
Cites and footnote omitted.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 does not carefully and
clearly proscribe the conduct it seeks to punish.

Subsection

(1) (b) incorporates Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202, which provides
criminal liability for anyone who "solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in
conduct which constitutes an offense . . . ."

The person of

average intelligence is unable to understand what this means, and
conform his or her conduct to such a law.
Of more concern is the complete failure to set forth
explicit standards for enforcement of the statute.

This statute

"impermissibly delegates policy matters to policemen, judges, and
juries for iresolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application."
Gravned, 408 U.S. at 108-9.
Section (5)(b) of the statute allows the enhancement to
be

applied

based

on

the

actions

of

uncharged

and

unnamed

individuals, thus denying defendants notice of the allegations
against them and precluding them from meeting those allegations.
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In State v. Roberts, 612 P.2d 360 (Utah 1980) and State v. Casarez,
656 P.2d 1005

(Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court found that

fundamental fairness requires that a criminal defendant be allowed
to inspect a presentence investigation report.

Sentencing a

defendant to an enhanced sentence based on uncharged and unnamed
parties is no better than sentencing defendants based on the
undisclosed allegations of a presentence investigation, and should
similarly fall under the due process clause.

See also State v.

Johnson, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5-6 (Utah 1993) (report of treatment
center, which contained double and triple hearsay, not sufficiently
reliable to be used in sentencing) . As set forth in Point IV.B.l.,
supra at 17, the statute also fails to set forth the proper
standard of proof to be applied.
Finally, § 76-3-203.1 does not meet its purpose in a
rational manner.

Although the statute's purpose is not clear on

its face, the legislative history of the gang enhancement indicates
that the statute was to be enforced in select cases involving
gangs.

Representative Rushton, sponsor of the bill in the House,

stated "the idea behind the enhanced penalties in California and
the idea here was to get that center core, that's the core group of
hardened criminals that supplies the money, supplies the impetus
for a true criminal street gang."
as Addendum B) .

Transcript at 3 (copy attached

The statute does not meet its purpose in a

rational manner.
Utah

Code

Ann.

§

76-3-203.1

unconstitutional.
21

should

be

declared

3.

The Evidence Here Fails to
Support a Finding that the Gang
Enhancement is Applicable.

There was no evidence introduced at trial concerning the
intent of the rear seat passenger in the car of the drive-by
shooter.

Kevin McCray testified that he was "no more than ten

feet" away when Mr. Labrum and Mr. Mills allegedly discussed their
intention to commit a drive-by shooting.

Mr. Behunin, the alleged

backseat passenger, was " [f]ifteen or 20 feet" away.

R. 287.

There

alleged

is

no

evidence

conversation, much

that

Mr.

Behunin

less participated

heard

in it.

the

Absent

proof

of

intent, Mr. Behunin is not criminally liable under § 76-2-202, and
Mr. Labrum's sentence may not be enhanced based on Mr. Behunin 7 s
presence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Labrum is entitled to a new trial due to omissions in
the transcription of the trial during the reading of the jury
instructions.

Mr. Labrum is entitled to a new trial due to the

prosecutor's misconduct in closing arguments.
If this Court fails to find that Mr. Labrum is entitled
to a new trial, then his sentence should be corrected.

The jury

made no finding that a firearm was used in the commission of this
offense.
vacated.

Absent such a finding, the firearm enhancement must be
The trial court made no written findings

concerning

application of the gang enhancement, so it must be vacated.

The

gang enhancement is unconstitutional, and should not be applied.
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The gang enhancement should not be applicable without a jury
finding of applicability. Finally, the evidence in this case fails
to support a finding that the gang enhancement is applicable. Mr.
Labrum's sentence should be corrected accordingly.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of September, 1993.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
Judgment, Sentence (Commitment)

* 2 2 1593

IN T H E THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UT
THE STATE OF UTAH.

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff.

case NO. ^ w n n q i

VS.

Count No.
i
Honorable
T«y t : - & a n l c
Clerk
r^tfrryu^.
ttwif
Reporter
€ v i z ^ h ^ , \Nalrairy:
Bailiff
K r i r h 1 Vlr,

Ircu Loibr IUV)

Defendant

D The motion of
. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted O denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted b y ^ a jury; a the court; D plea of guilty;
D plea of np contest; of the offense of ^ t ^ ^ ^ p r ^ ^ r a ^ n l j W i | / w Mti/fffa^
t a felony
1**«
of the
. misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
degree, D a class.
represented by n . irh/i&o/*
and the State being represented by g.^Wftrvrgof. is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D
G
p(
O
O
Q
Td

years and which may be for life;
to a maximum mandatory term of
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $.
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $gQTl-frfl tn V ich*i ftrp/Sayo ^ frt <\snt* \Ne9tdr j Dflnet tw*

\m<zm*r
-*
D such sentence is to run concurrently with
& such sentence is to run consecutively with (qanj flrrt R l Y f f l r h i -f,v\\^lY\Urvcv\V StTifcryvrgt
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s)
are hereby dismissed.
O Defendant is granted a stay of the above (a prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent. Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
) d Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County Otfor delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitmej
^ Commitment shall issue "forthrtlfo

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel
-SO

*' 1 -*-Deputy County Attorney
i w h i i * . rAufti

(Gr««n—Judml

Page
(Yallow— Jail/Pnson/AP&Pt

(Pmk—Oatensal

(Goktenrod—State}

_Lof_i
nnOCCO

ADDENDUM B
Legislative History of.§ 76-3-203.1

LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN SENATE BILL 52, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
76-3-203.1, THE PENALTY ENHANCEMENT FOR OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THREE
OR MORE PERSONS.
Legislative History:
Senate Bill 52, currently found in Utah Code Ann* section
76-3-203*1, and referred to in L* 1990, ch. 207 section 1, was
passed on February 21, 1990, approved on March 12, 1990, and became
effective on April 23, 1990.
The Office of Legislative Counsel to the Utah Legislature
has no committee reports concerning this legislation. The only
evidence of legislative intent to be found outside the statute
itself is the taped and transcribed floor debates in the house and
the senate. Tapes are available at the respective offices in the
Utah State Capitol.

House Floor debates on Senate Bill 52
February 21, 1990
Speaker of the House:
Who's the sponsor of Senate Bill 52?
Rushton.

Representative

Representative Rushton:
Ah, this is kind of a surprise that it come up so fast this
morning, ah, Senate Bill 52 is what's ended up after a lot
of research this summer on the street gang problems, mostly
in the Salt Lake County, some in Davis and Utah County.
Ah, I'm sure most counties that have any town size at all
will have ... be affected by the street gangs that are
coming into Utah. There's several reasons why there's such
a giant influx of criminal street gangs in Utah. The main
reason is the price differential of crack cocaine. Ah, in
Los Angeles, crack cocaine is in a surplus or a buyer's
market. It can be bought between three and four hundred
dollars an ounce. That same crack cocaine will sell in
Salt Lake for somewhere around twenty four hundred dollars
an ounce in some rural cities in Utah we'll get as much as
three hundred ...er three thousand dollars an ounce. This
price differential has brought about a phenomenon with the
Los Angeles street gangs that's called franchising. The
reason it's called franchising, it isn't a whole lot
different than McDonald's. They franchise out. We've
always had local street gangs in Utah. They've been
involved in petty crime, a social service nuisance, anyone
who lives in this metropolitan area is familiar with them,
the graffiti, ah, when I was a boy thirty five years ago,

there were street gangs in Salt Lake City. Ah, but they
they weren't the serious problem that they are becoming now
with the introduction of crack cocaine. Ah, police
departments estimate that in the Salt Lake valley now there
are six hundred plus members, identifiable members of these
California style street gangs. Of that six hundred, it is
estimated that a hardened criminal core of the gangs,
generally young adults — the gangs consist of youths all
the way from nine, and I call them youths, nine to twenty
five, thirty years old. The young adults that belong to
this gang are, these gangs, it is estimated about three
percent of this group are hardened criminals with
associations with the street gangs in Los Angeles. When I
became aware of the existence of Los Angeles type gangs in
existence in my own neighborhood in Magna, and West Valley,
I become quite alarmed. It's a scary thought when we know
what happened to the Bronx in New York in the sixties
because of street gangs. Three hundred and seventy
something acres of the Bronx had to be literally given up
from the law enforcement and levelled. One of the most
vivid pictures of the street gang history in New York City,
er, the Bronx in New York was three hundred and seventy
acres of what was once communities, towns, neighborhoods,
as they call them in New York, and those buildings were
bulldozed down, every last one of them, because of the
situation that arose out of the Bronx street gangs in the
fifties and sixties. Right now there are large areas of
Los Angeles where law enforcement has given up. They have
been bulldozed down. I don't think that situation will
ever come to Salt Lake or to Ogden, Clearfield, where the
street gangs are trenched right now, but elements of that
environment have came to Salt Lake. Ah, Senator Fordham
and myself become alarmed about this in about July of last
year. We inquired of the Los Angeles County Attorney's
Office on what was being done to prevent street gangs in
there, they told us about a piece of legislation in
California called "The Street Terrorism Prevention Act."
We brought a copy of that act to Otah, we got a lot of
literature about it, and we had a bill written up that
patterned the Street Terrorism Act. But since that time,
that act has run into constitutional problems in
California, so we bad representatives from SWAP, do a lot
of research on it, and they came up, the Statewide
Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, in conjunction with
the Chief Police Association, came up with this bill, the
SroQp criminal activities penalty, which they feel
confident avoids the constitutional problems of the
California Street Terrorism Act and will be a useful tool.
It doesn't have the political or the psychological effects
that our original Street Terrorism had, because we used the
term gang, we used the term street terrorism in our bill,
and they told us this was the reason why it would become
constitutionally unsound. So, if you read the bill it will
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not have the word "street gang" in it, in order to make it
so we're not, the constitutional problem comes with
labelling people by name* It is, looks benign, "Group
Criminal Activities Penalty," but this is in fact what the
Statewide of Prosecuting Attorneys have asked for and want
for tools to be used against street gang prolification
[sic] in the state of Utah. Ah, I can go through the act,
ah, but the main parts of the act at first is it provides
an enhanced penalty for group criminal activities, and that
is supplied on line twenty four of first page, "if crimes
are committed in concert of two or more persons" used in
this second, the second page describes the enhanced
penalties, ah, the idea behind the enhanced penalties in
California and the idea here was to get that center core,
that's the core group of hardened criminals that supplies
the money, supplies the impetus for a true criminal street
gang. We've got to differentiate that between a street
gang and a criminal street gang - it's a different world
altogether. Ah, it gets to the hardened core, and the
social workers tell us that the only thing to do with them
to allow social workers to work with the remainder of the
young people at risk in these gangs is to get that hardened
core off the streets. The enhanced penalty is designed for
that purpose. Ah, so the second page deals with the
enhanced penalties* The third page is a list of crimes
that are effected by this bill and an important aspect of
this bill that I hope will placate those that are worried
about enhanced penalties, across this, I see John look at
me right in the eyes. Because John and I have agreed on a
lot of things and both of agree that enhanced penalties are
something that has to be proven that there's a need for
before you talk about it because a lot of enhanced
penalties don't do anything more than create problems for
the corrections. But this enhanced penalty, we have got to
get that hard core of the street gang groups off of the
streets, out of the street gangs. Ah, to soften the
enhanced penalty, if you'll notice on the last page, page
five of the bill, ah, the sentencing judge, rather than the
jury, shall decide whether to impose the penalty. We are
not going to make any effort to take the judicial
discretion out of this penalty phase. It will give the
judge the right, if he feels that that individual needs to
be taken out of that situation for this enhanced period of
time, the judge still has the discretion to either take him
out for an enhanced period of time or - him, I shouldn't
use. him - take this person out for enhanced period of time
or not. Ah, I think that the bill is self explanatory and
t-hac it does have the support of the Statewide Police Chief
Xssociation and the Statewide Prosecuting Attorneys
Association, ah, the bill came from them as an answer to a
problem that we brought to them. And I'd stand to ask,
answer, any questions, ah, ...
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Speaker of the House:
Representatives to the bill. Representative Millner?
Representative Millner:
Thank you, Mr, Speaker. First of all, I'd like to declare
a conflict because I am a member of a street gang. I
thought I'd get your attention with that. Um, I happen to
have a group of young children in my neighborhood who are
the siblings of members of street gangs. And, ah, in
trying to perhaps dissuade them from criminal activities,
we've formulated our own street gang, and of course our
intents and purposes are perhaps to be, um, good for the
neighborhood, and um, ah, we tried to take on little
projects for that. But, I stand in support of this bill,
but I do want to kind of state some concerns that I have,
and that it that many times we have failed in our society
to address in the concerns of our youth, which lead to
juvenile street gangs, and I feel that many young people
who come from broken homes and who don't have the
environmental supports, or perhaps church support systems,
kind of fall between the cracks. And so we have a
responsibility, each one of us, if we see these young
people, who get caught up in criminal activities, to try
and become their friends and encourage them to get out of
that kind of activity and lead them light, and so I stand
in support of this bill, but I also want to send a
message. And that message is that we need to provide
opportunities for these young people, educational
opportunities and employment for those who particularly get
involved in juvenile crimes, and ah, so they don't get into
drugs and other activities. And so I support the bill,
thank you.
Speaker of the House:
Representative Hales?
Representative Hales:
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I would like to speak in support
of this very important legislation. I have a good citizen
in my district who is in the business of coin operated game
machines. Ah, he operates in several states, Utah is one
of these, and he said in the past three or four months,
these gang groups have cost him, as well as the stores, ah,
Shopko, Smith's Pood King, as much as thirty thousand
dollars in just a very short period of time. But he said
in.addition to the theft, and the property damage that has
occurred, he has been really concerned about the
aggressiveness of these groups. He said that very often
-these thefts occur during the time that the stores are
open, sometimes at night when there's one night clerk on,
they intimidate the night clerk. And as I became aware of
this problem, and have visited with more people, I don't
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think we're really talking about these neighborhood
children that Representative Millner has talked about,
although it could be. Ah, they say that these groups are
sophisticated enough that they know what the state laws
are, and very often they will move around according to what
the state law is that handles this kind of theft and this
kind of aggression and property damage. So I urge your
support of this legislation. I think it's really important
and I have my hat off to those who've, a Senator Fordham
and those who have brought this to our attention. Thank
you.
Speaker of the House:
Representative, ah, Turtle?
Representative Tuttle:
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I stand in support of this bill
also. In the Magna times issue this summer, there was an
article and pictures about the grafitti that was put in the
buildings in Magna by different groups that are either
copycatting the groups in California or members, and I
think it's well needed and I think we should support this.
Thank you.
Speaker of the House:
Representative Bush?
Representative Bush:
Oops. Thank you Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this .
bill and I would ... Representative...sorry, Representative
Rushton and Senator Fordham for looking into this. There's
no sense waiting until our state becomes like some of these
other areas of the country before we start doing something
about it. I don't have any special horror stories to tell,
but ah, this, I think this is one of the most important
pieces of legislation we've had, and I commend them for it
and ask you to support it.
Speaker of the House:
Representative Prante?
Representative Prante:
Thank you, Mr. Speaker, will the sponsor yield to a
question?
Representative Rushton:
Yeah.
Speaker of the House:
Sponsor yields, proceed.

S

Representative Prante:
He f s sitting right next to me, but I just want this
clarified for myself. It's bard to ask him when he's on
the microphone. Ah, the question I have is I'm all for
what the bill's doing, but the question I have and perhaps,
ah, Representative Rusbton can respond to it, is that when
it refers to that a person commits a — two or more people
committing a crime, and ah, such crimes as burglary and
criminal trespass being those kind of crimes, I'm wondering
if anytime two people, especially young people who haven't
learned, maybe are yielding to impulse sometimes, and
aren't members of actual gangs, how does it impact on them?
Representative Rushton:
The answer to these question probably would be better
answered by a lawyer than by me, but I'm told that it is
contained in the following paragraph when it talks about
the concert action of two or more persons. Ah, it's also
will fall, the problem that he talks about if if just two
people commit burglary together does this constitute group
criminal activities? Or three people it would have to be.
You got the two people and the individual, the individual
who does this in concern with two other people. Ah, I
think that the best cover here is in the judicial
discretion that's allowed in the last page. Ah, and the
definition of concert action between these people • a legal
definition.
Representative Prante:
Where's the definition?
Representative Rushton:
Ah, it's in section 76-2-202. Yeah, well, that's the
judicial.
Representative Prante:
Maybe you could just read the section that's applicable to
this, Representative, that shows the court's discretion?
Representative Rushton:
I don't have my book with me.
Representative Prante:
Oh. Okay% Maybe ah, an attorney can comment on this. My
concern isn't with what it's doing, it's with, what if two
people _steal apples off a tree? Or what if two people
"impossibly, impulsively take something from a home, are
they suddenly convicted of essentially gang activities? •.•
Ah, I see there is the court discretion in it. Okay, thank
you.
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Representative Rushton:
Yeah, that's what I was saying, that, thank you.
Speaker of the House:
Representative Fuller?
Representative Fuller:
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Call for a previous question?

Speaker of the House:
Previous question has been called. All in favor of the
previous question say "Aye"? Opposed "no"? Motion
carries. Representative Rushton, you may sum up.
Representative Rushton:
I could talk all night on gang problems in my neighborhood
and all I have to say is when you see a young person with
the blue skull cap of the California Crips 'gang in your
neighborhood, if you're not scared, you don't understand
what's going on. And ah, this law is directed at the core,
it's not directed, as Joann has expressed, kids that are at
risk, you see them wearing the gang signs, their ball cap
turned around backwards on the West, or they sign each
other with finger signs like this as they go by. Each gang
has its own finger sign. Ah, these people that are at
risk, and these are kids at risk. This bill is directed at
that core criminal element, that three percent of those six
hundred gang members that have been identified that provide
the father figure in these gangs. And they provide also
the connection the California gangs, the connection to the
crack cocaine, the money that is fueling this explosion of
gang activity in our cities and I'd like to ask you for
your support for this bill and thank you for your time.
Speaker of the House:
Voting's open on Senate Bill 52. ... It appears to the
chair that all present have voted. Voting is closed on
Senate Bill 52. Senate Bill 52 has received 61 affirmative
and no negative votes passes
this House.
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Senate Floor debates on Senate Bill 52
January 23 and 24/ 1990
January 23, 1990
Senator Fordham:
Ah/ Mr. President and fellow Senators, this is an important
bill. Ah/ we've worked on this bill since the middle of
the summer/ worked with the Attorney General's Office, with
prosecuting attorneys in this state, with other divisions
of enforcement in this state. Originally, we had a bill
called the "Organization Gang Bill." In ah working with
California, who this bill was patterned after, their bill,
and after they passed their law, we had an influx of gang
members coming from California and infiltrating into Otah
and establishing residence here and working as ah in their
organization as members of, who had broken off from the
California gangs. I think we need to send a message to
these organized people that there isn't a place for them in
Utah. Now we've had, in working with California, their
problem was that it was so difficult to prove that a
individual was a member of an organized gang. We changed
our bill to read "Group Criminal Activity" and it involves
when two or more commit a crime, then they're subject to
the penalties that are made in this law. And ah let me
just read what, quickly if I can, a class B misdemeanor,
the individual shall serve a minimum of ninety consecutive
days in the jail. If the offense is a class A misdemeanor,
the convicted person shall serve a minimum term of a
hundred and eighty consecutive days. If the offense is a
third degree felony the convicted person shall be sentenced
to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison. If
the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person
shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years
in prison. And if the. offense is a first degree felony,
the person shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term
of nine years in prison. We felt that we need to make very
restrictrive [sic], and these, ah these charges would be
administered and sentenced by the judge without always
going to a jury hearing. It would depend on the ah crime
that was committed if they had a jury hearing. I have many
clippings, too many to go over# let me just read you the
heads of some of these that happens in our state. "Warning
signs blew up at side of girl's bed," and this is in
school/ ah Eearns. Here's, "Suspect arrested in shooting
at a market." This is in December 28 of last year.
"Police believe two arrested teens belong to dangerous new
qanqr" "Galig fight leaves three stabbed." "Street gang
fires on a family/ two die." "Spray painted grafitti/" and
this bill covers those acts, that if it's this kind of
destruction of property is committed by two or more people,
there's a penalty for them and they're, it's just something
that we need to adopt to control this. Now in working with
the prosecutors/ they felt that it was very difficult under
the gang bill to identify these people with the gangs.
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California, in working with them and talking with them, ah,
wishes that they had developed their law the way we're
developing this one in Utah. It would be much more
enforceable by them. How I might just show you the volume
here is the California gang law that they have. So if
there are any questions that I could respond to, I'd be
glad to, Mr. President.
President of the Senate:
Senator Chuck Peterson?
Senator Chuck Peterson:
Mr. Fordham, ah, Senator Fordham, is this differentiate, is
it the location code a differentiation between juvenile and
other people, I mean, ah, would your bill apply to
juveniles under eighteen?
Senator Fordham:
It would apply to any crime that was committed by two or
more persons.
Senator Chuck Peterson:
That's what I'm wondering about. I'll have to ask the
legal people on the Senate, the lawyers, whether or not
this is possible for us to pass legislation that would
apply to, that would provide these penalties for a
juvenile. I just don't know whether or not we can do
that. Senator Hillyard?
Senator Hillyard:
My problem when I read that Senator Peterson is the fact
that there's three of us here together and that may
constitute a criminal gang.
Senator Chuck Peterson:
That's for sure. I think it does.
question about that.

Yeah, I, there's no

Senator Hillyard:
I would say this. The general law defining juveniles in
that section would override this unless there is a specific
mention of that and I'd have to look at the law. I was not
on the committee when this bill was debated, ah, I had
another conflict that took me out of these bills. I have
not had a chance to see that but I think that's a
legitimate question that staff who drafted the bill could
answer.
President of tlie-Senate:
Senator Steel?
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Senator Steele:
Thank you, Mr. President, I have a question as it relate to
ah, relates to a potential in our state of moving towards
what's termed in many states, "shock incarceration"• In
quick summary, as a listing, first time felons, for
example, ages eighteen through twenty six are placed in
some states in a ninety day incarceration boot camp
environment• The recidivism, the impact on those
particular individuals in the cites that I noted, I've had
discussion with, seems to be very effective and very
appealing and our state is looking as possible alternatives
to what we're currently doing. Would these minimum, my
question, these minimum requirements, ah circumvent that
process?
Senator Pordham:
I don't think that it would circumvent it, I think they
would be part of* The judge has the authority to say where
these individuals would be incarcerated or be subjected to
review or whatever, as I understand it, the judge would be
able to put these people where they, where he felt that it
would be the most good for them.
President of the Senate:
Further questions of Senator Pordham? Senator Cornaby, are
you voting on that one... I don't see any further questions
then.
Unidentified speaker:
I move for' the adoption of the bill.
President of the Senate:
Question has been called, for the question shall Senate
Bill 52 be read for the third time?
[Senators vote orally]
Senate Bill 52 shows twenty five ayes, no nays, four being absent,
the bill passes, to be placed on the third reading calendar.

January 24, 1990
President of the Senate:
Senator McCallister?
Senator Pordham
Personal privilege Mr.

